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Dangerous-goods shipments remain regulated despite the widespread deregulation of the transportationindustry. This is mainly due to the societal and environmental risks associated with these shipments. One of
the common tools used by governments in mitigating transport risk is to close certain roads to vehicles carrying
hazardous materials. In effect, the road network available to dangerous goods carriers can be determined by the
government. The associated transport risk, however, is determined by the carriers’ route choices. We provide
a bilevel programming formulation for this network design problem. Our approach is unique in terms of its
focus on the nature of the relationship between the regulator and carriers. We present an application of our
methodology in Western Ontario, Canada.
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Many of the materials transported by trucks, trains,
vessels, and planes are flammable, explosive, poi-
sonous, corrosive, or radioactive. Despite being poten-
tially harmful to the environment and to people,
these materials are essential for industrial develop-
ment. Hazardous materials (hazmats) are used exten-
sively in fueling vehicles and heating homes/offices,
as well as in manufacturing, mining, farming, and
medicine. During the past decade, hazmat transporta-
tion reached unprecedented levels. In the United
States, for example, there are at least 300 million haz-
ardous shipments each year totaling approximately
3.2 billion tons.
The vast majority of dangerous-goods shipments
arrive at their destination safely. In 1998, there were
roughly 15,000 incidents related to hazmat trans-
portation in the United States (U.S. Department of
Transportation 1999). Only 429 of these were clas-
sified as “serious incidents,” resulting in 13 deaths
and 198 injuries. Given the large number of haz-
mat shipments, however, there remains the potential
for catastrophic incidents with multiple fatalities,
injuries, large-scale evacuations, and severe environ-
mental damage. For example, 18 of the 20 deaths in
a 1993 bus-truck collision in Quebec were attributed
to the spill and explosion of gasoline from the truck
(Transport Canada 1999). In 1996, over 16,250 gallons
of chlorine were released from a derailed train in
Montana, resulting in 1 fatality, 787 hospitalizations,
1,000 evacuations, and over $4.5 million in cleanup
costs. Due to the involuntary nature and potential
magnitude of these undesirable consequences, special
interest groups (for example, environmentalists, the
media) and the public at large are very sensitive to the
dangers of transporting hazmats. Thus, regulation of
dangerous-goods shipments is usually within a gov-
ernment’s mandate.
In this paper, we focus on a popular measure uti-
lized by regulators in order to reduce the transport
risk in their jurisdiction—that is, a government’s
authority to close certain road segments to haz-
mat transportation and, in effect, to decide the road
network that can be used for hazmat shipments.
There are a number of other policy tools available to
a government agency for mitigating hazmat transport
risk. These include requirements pertaining to driver
training, driving hours, container specifications, and
accident insurance. Establishment of inspection sta-
tions to monitor compliance with the regulations,
and emergency response systems to minimize conse-
quences of the incidents, are quite common. Although
a comprehensive policy would typically involve the
simultaneous use of these alternative means, this
paper is confined to the selection of road segments
(from an existing road network) that would be avail-
able to hazmat carriers.
Carrier companies and governments have quite dif-
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movements. Carriers are naturally in the pursuit
of their bottom line, while satisfying the safety
requirements stipulated by the regulator, whereas
governments aim at reducing the public and envi-
ronmental risk without threatening the economic
viability of hazmat transportation. Another notable
difference is the scope of the problem. A government
has to consider all the shipments in its jurisdiction,
which would typically involve a variety of hazmats
and a large number of origin-destination pairs. A car-
rier, however, can plan each shipment separately. An
overwhelming majority of the hazmat transportation
literature adopts a carrier’s viewpoint by focusing on
problems with a single hazmat and a single origin-
destination pair.
The main theme of the prevailing studies is assess-
ment of the transport risk associated with a shipment
and finding the route that minimizes this risk. The
resulting minimum risk route is typically compared
with the minimum cost route, assuming that a carrier
would normally use the latter. Various definitions of
risk have been proposed. Saccomono and Chan (1985)
and Abkowitz et al. (1992) consider the likelihood of
having a hazmat incident during transportation as
their risk measure. This model does not incorporate
the consequences of an incident and, hence, it is more
suitable for the hazmats with relatively small dan-
ger zones. Batta and Chiu (1988) represent transport
risk as the number of people living within a thresh-
old distance from the route. This model emphasizes
“exposure” to hazmats rather than the occurence of an
incident. Revelle et al. (1991) use a weighted combi-
nation of population exposure and transportation cost
in finding routes for radioactively contaminated fuel
rods. Alp (1995) and Erkut and Verter (1995a) focus
on the expected number of people that would suffer
the consequences of a possible hazmat incident. All
of the above papers identify the minimum risk path
for the shipment via a shortest path algorithm that
uses the proposed risk measure as the arc impedance.
The reader is referred to List et al. (1991) and Erkut
and Verter (1995b) for comprehensive reviews on haz-
mat transportation.
We know of two notable exceptions to the carrier-
oriented perspective of the literature. List and
Mirchandani (1991) present a detailed model for rout-
ing hazmats and locating hazardous-waste treatment
facilities. Their model minimizes total cost, total soci-
etal risk, and maximum risk imposed on an individ-
ual. The application of the model in Albany (New
York), however, is based on a number of simplifi-
cations, including point representation of population
centers and consideration of a single hazmat. Iakovou
et al. (1999) provide a multicommodity network flow
model for the problem of routing hazardous vessels.
Their aim is to avoid overloading certain links of the
transport network, which usually happens when the
optimal route for each shipment is identified indepen-
dent of the other shipments. The model is applied to
the transportation of crude oil and refined petroleum
products in the Gulf of Mexico. Note that U.S. Coast
Guard has the authority to designate the route to be
followed by the vessels between an origin-destination
pair.
In this paper, we adopt the viewpoint of the reg-
ulator and analyze the problem of selecting a road
network for dangerous-goods shipments from an
existing transportation infrastructure. We provide a
bilevel programming formulation that is unique in
terms of its focus on the nature of the relationship
between the government and the carriers. To the
best of our knowledge, this problem has not been
addressed before in the academic literature, and there-
fore we provide a detailed description and a formal
definition in §1. Section 2 presents the mathemati-
cal formulation, whereas the development of a solu-
tion procedure based on the analytical properties of
the model is outlined in §3. An application of our
methodology in Western Ontario is summarized in §4.
Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in §5.
1. The Hazardous-Network
Design Problem
In regulating dangerous-goods shipments, a govern-
ment agency would typically be concerned with the
transport risk imposed on the population centers due
to heavy hazmat traffic. Ideally, the total risk can
be minimized if the minimum risk route were to be
used for each shipment. In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, the agency in charge of hazmat transport is not
equipped with the legal power to designate the route
to be used between an origin-destination pair. Typ-
ically, the policy tool available to the agency is the
authority to prohibit the use of certain road segments
by trucks carrying (certain types of) dangerous goods.
The remaining roads constitute the “hazardous net-
work” on which hazmat carriers would be allowed
to operate. Note that it is the routing decisions of the
carriers on the available network that determine not
only their own operational costs, but also the total
transport risk imposed on the public. In this con-
text, the problem on which we focus in this paper is
defined as follows: Given an existing road network,
the hazardous-network design problem involves selecting
the road segments that should be closed to hazmat
transport so as to minimize the total risk. A schematic
representation of the problem is depicted in Figure 1.
Clearly, we approach the hazardous-network design
problem from a strategic perspective in this paper. In
the last section, however, we will comment on the use
of tactical decisions (such as time-based curfews on






























































Kara and Verter: Designing a Road Network
190 Transportation Science 38(2), pp. 188–196, © 2004 INFORMS
Government
Minimize Total Risk (Selected PATHS)
Design the TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
Each Carrier
Minimize Total Cost (Selected PATHS)
Select PATHS over the TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
Figure 1 Hazardous-Network Design Problem
It is important that the solution to the hazardous-
network design problem is determined by the choices
of two distinct (groups of) decision makers, i.e., the
government and the carriers. Although their deci-
sions collectively influence the outcome, each stake-
holder has a different set of objectives. In modeling
the problem, for example, we analyze the case where
population exposure is the risk measure used by the
government and the distance traveled is the basis for
the carriers’ route choices. Naturally, there are other
possible objectives for each party. For example, the
government might prioritize reduction of the total
incident probability, whereas the carriers might put
more emphasis on the total operational costs and/or
insurance costs. Note that the government agency is
in a leader position here due to its legal authority,
whereas the carriers have to follow the regulations in
order to be able to continue their operations. Hence,
we propose a bilevel framework to represent the prob-
lem as depicted in Figure 1.
Our approach is different from the prevailing
methodology in the following two ways. First, we
make an explicit attempt to capture the leader-
follower relationship between the government and
the carriers by the use of a bilevel framework. This
is because the effect of each stakeholder’s decision
on the other party is only indirect. That is, the gov-
ernment can only influence the carriers’ decisions
through designing the hazardous network, whereas
the carriers can influence the governments’ decisions
via the risk implications of their route choices. There-
fore, in this problem, there is not a single body
who can make the trade-off between these two typ-
ically conflicting objectives. Since the determination
of a realistic set of weights would be problematic,
aggregation of the two objectives in a single additive
objective function may not produce a solution that is
mutually acceptable.
Second, we recognize that identifying the minimum
risk route for each shipment and simply defining the
hazardous network as the union of these routes may
not produce the best result for the regulator. Although
this has become a common practice in the risk-
assessment literature, the regulator’s ability to imple-
ment the prescribed solution is questionable. Note
that the inclusion of all the minimum risk routes in
the network does not guarantee their use by the car-
riers. Each road link included in the network would
be open to all shipments (of certain hazmat types).
Thus, the network may contain alternatives for rout-
ing some of the shipments, in which case the carri-
ers would use the routes with minimum cost. Unless
the routes are actually designated by the regulator,
the traditional approach to hazardous-network design
would always underestimate the resulting transport
risk.
Now we turn to the mathematical formulation of
the bilevel structure we propose for the hazardous-
network design problem. Although the mathemati-
cal model is developed for population exposure and
travel distance as the relevant objectives, our method-
ology can easily be used for other risk and cost
measures.
2. A Bilevel Model
Evidently, the hazardous-network design problem
lends itself to a bilevel programming formulation. The
outer problem belongs to the regulator and involves
decisions to determine the road links that should
be included in the network, whereas the inner prob-
lem belongs to the carriers and entails the routing
decisions on the available network. As depicted in
Figure 1, the regulator needs to make the network
design decisions so that the total risk resulting from
the carriers’ route choices is minimized.
We represent the existing road system by network
G = NA, where N denotes the set of nodes and
A denotes the set of road links (indexed by i j 	
i j ∈N ) that connect the nodes. Typically, a variety of
dangerous goods are transported across G from their
origin (o ∈ N ) to their destination (d ∈ N ). The set of
hazmat types is represented by M (indexed by m).
Let C (indexed by c) denote the set of all shipments
across G. Each shipment c ∈ C is characterized by its
origin oc, destination dc, and the type of hazmat
carried mc.
Let P denote the set of population centers (indexed
by p) affected by the hazmat transportation activ-
ity. We assume that the undesirable consequences of
a hazmat incident occur within a threshold distance
from the accident site, which depends on the hazmat
type. That is, when a hazmat truck travels across a
road link, only the people within the threshold dis-
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ij the number of people in p exposed to a truck
carrying hazmat m through link i j,
lij length of link i j,
nc number of trucks used for shipment c.
Decision Variables
Ymij 1 if link i j is available for transportation of haz-
mat type m, 0 otherwise,
Xcij 1 if link i j is used for shipment c, 0 otherwise.







































Xcij ∈01 ∀ij∈Ac∈C (4)
The inner problem is represented by (1)–(4). Note
that the binary decision variables of the outer prob-
lem, i.e., Ymij , constitute parameters for the inner prob-
lem. Given the values of Ymij , the inner problem
boils down to a minimum cost network flow model.
Constraints (2) are the flow balance requirements,
whereas (3) ensure that only the links made available
by the government can be used by the carriers. In fact,
the inner problem decomposes into C constrained
shortest path problems and the route choices made
for these C shipments, i.e., Xcij , determine the objec-
tive function value of the outer problem. As evident
from HND, we simply add the risks imposed by the
transport activity on different links, which results in
the linearity of the objective function. The additivity
of impacts from two or more links around a popula-
tion center is, in fact, an assumption we made. One
can easily think of instances where there exist nonlin-
earities associated with the superposition of multiple
risk impacts.
If the existing road network is connected, there
is always a feasible solution to HND. Thus, the
model accurately represents real life, where the haz-
mat shipment between an o-d pair needs to be car-
ried out despite the undesirability of the associated
risk. It is possible, however, to extend HND so as
to limit the exposure at any population center by









ij ≤ p, where p is the
maximum allowable exposure at population center p.
A possible motivation for posing such limits might
be the presence of schools, hospitals, nursing homes,
etc. at a population center. The Xcij values deter-
mine whether this constraint is satisfied. However, the
resulting level of exposure at each population center
is a concern primarily for the regulator, and hence this
constraint belongs to the outer problem. We suggest
caution in using constraints of the above form because
they can impose infeasibility. Similarly, the number
of trucks traversing any link can be constrained, i.e.,∑
c∈C ncXcij ≤ ij , where ij is the maximum number of
trucks allowed on link i j. Since the level of hazmat
traffic on a link is among the regulators’ concerns, this
constraint would be appended to the outer problem
as well.
3. Solution Methodology
In this section, we present a solution methodology for
HND that takes advantage of its analytical proper-
ties. For ease of exposition, we will focus on the basic
model formulation. We start with a brief overview of
the relevant literature.
Bard (1998) provides a comprehensive overview of
the state of the art in bilevel optimization algorithms.
The most common solution strategy for linear bilevel
problems is based on representation of the inner prob-
lem by the use of its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions. For bilevel problems with integer or binary
variables, however, branch and bound has been the
prevailing solution scheme. In this section, we present
a solution algorithm for HND that takes advantage of
its structural properties.
As noted in the previous section, the inner problem
(1)–(4) has to be solved on the basis of a set of avail-
able links determined by the outer problem. Once
the Ymij values are given, however, the inner problem
is unimodular (Wolsey 1998). Hence, the integrality
requirements (4) in the inner problem can be replaced
by Xcij ≥ 0 without loss of optimality. This enables us
to represent the inner problem via the KKT condi-
tions of its LP relaxation. The optimum solution to
the inner problem can be obtained by solving the fea-
sibility problem defined by (2), (3), and the following
set of constraints:
Xcij ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A 4′
nclij −wci +wcj − vcij +!cij = 0 ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A (5)
vcijX
c
ij = 0 ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A (6)
!cij X
c
ij −Ymcij = 0 ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A (7)
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Thus, HND can be reformulated as a single-level
model by representing the inner problem with the
equivalent feasibility problem. The objective functions
of the single-level model and the outer problem are
the same. Note that unimodularity of the inner prob-
lem is based on Ymij being a set of parameters at
this level. In the single-level representation of the
hazardous-network design problem, however, opti-
mal values of Ymij and X
c
ij are determined simultane-
ously. This structural change in the coefficient matrix
causes the loss of unimodularity. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to reimpose integrality on the Xcij variables by
replacing (4′) with (4) in the single-level model.
Although the inner problem in HND can be elimi-
nated as described above, the resulting mixed integer
program contains nonlinear Constraints (6) and (7).
These constraints can be linearized by taking advan-
tage of the binary nature of Xcij and Y
m
ij variables.
When R is a large number, the following constitutes
the linearization:
vcij ≤R1−Xcij  ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A 6′
!cij ≤R#1− Y mcij −Xcij $ ∀ c ∈C i j ∈A 7′













s.t. 2 3 4 5 6′ 7′ 8
Y mij ∈ 01 ∀m ∈Mi j ∈A
HND′ is a linear model with binary variables,




Figure 2 Population Centers and Highway System of Western Ontario
solvers available in the market. The solution of the
model prescribes the road network that should be
available to hazmat carriers, as well as the carri-
ers’ route choices on this network. The correspond-
ing objective function value determines the minimum
population exposure attainable by banning certain
road segments to hazmat trucks.
Although the discussion in the section is confined
to the basic model, HND, the solution methodology is
equally valid for its extensions, outlined in the previ-
ous section. This is because the unimodularity of the
inner problem is not affected by the constraints added
to the outer problem.
4. Application in Western Ontario
In this section, we present an application of the pro-
posed methodology to determine the highway seg-
ments in Western Ontario that should be closed
to trucks carrying dangerous goods. Our study is
focused on shipments of gasoline, fuel oil, petroleum
and coal tar, and alcohol. According to Statistics
Canada, which constitutes our primary source of data,
these four materials account for 56% of all the haz-
mats transported through Canadian highways. Note
that the model requires detailed information on pop-
ulation exposure across the region of interest, i.e.,

pm
ij . Geographical information systems (GIS) pro-
vide an effective framework for estimating these risk
parameters. We used ESRI’s ArcView 3.1 software in
developing a GIS-based representation of the popula-
tion centers, highway system, and hazmat shipments
in Western Ontario. Figure 2 depicts the population
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the first two layers of information in our GIS-based
model.
The records of Statistics Canada indicate the ori-
gin, destination, and hazmat type of each shipment,
as well as the number of trucks used. We assume
that each truck containing the same hazmat poses
the same risk, because reliable information on the
actual amounts carried is unavailable. More impor-
tantly, there is no record of the actual routes used
by the carriers. In 1998, there were over 100000
shipments within Western Ontario involving gasoline,
fuel oil, petroleum and coal tar, or alcohol. Shipments
originating from and/or destined to locations outside
the region are not included in this statistic. We focus
on the o-d pairs with an annual shipment volume
of more than 500 trucks. The transportation between
these o-d pairs amounts to 78% of all the shipments
within Western Ontario. Table 1 presents a summary
of the shipment data used in our analysis.
According to the 1996 population census, there are
66 census subdivisions in this region with a popu-
lation density larger than 40 people per square kilo-
meter. Each such subdivision constitutes a popula-
tion center in our model. Consequently, we represent
the spatial distribution of 7.23 million people, which
amounts to 95% of the total population of Ontario.
The most densely populated census subdivisions in
the region are York and Toronto, with 4,540 and 4,099
people per square kilometer, respectively.
We use the highway map provided in ArcView 3.1
as a basis. In its original form, this highway network
is not suitable for representing hazmat transportation.
Note that only a few of the shipment origin and des-
tination points are actually on a highway. Neverthe-
less, trucks are usually required to use shortest routes
in urban areas, when they are off the highway sys-
tem. Thus, we represent the origin and destination
points in our model by projecting their original loca-
tion onto the closest highway segment. Consequently,
the nodes of our model include the origin and des-
tination points as well as the highway intersections
and highway endpoints. Each existing highway seg-
ment between a node pair is represented as a link.
The resulting network model of Western Ontario has
48 nodes and 57 links.
Transport Canada (Transport Canada 1996) requires
evacuation of the people within 800 meters of a spill
Table 1 Hazmat Shipments in Western Ontario
Number of
Hazmat Type o-d Pairs Trucks
Gasoline 22 37221
Fuel Oil 18 21266
Petroleum & coal tar 12 20566
Alcohol 1 519
site if the incident involves a gasoline, fuel oil, or alco-
hol truck. Since these three materials pose the same
exposure, we refer to them as the H800 group. The
evacuation distance is 1600 meters for spills involv-
ing petroleum and coal tar, which we call H1600. Thus,
M = H800H1600 in our model. When a hazmat truck
uses a road link, all the people within the associated
distance from that highway segment are exposed to
the risk of being evacuated.
Using the GIS-based model, we determined the
exposure zones around each link for evacuation dis-
tances of 800 meters and 1600 meters. We esti-
mated the pmij values by overlaying the population
zones on these exposure zones. The GIS-based model
also enabled us to estimate the length of each road
link, i.e., lij . The hazardous-network design model for
Western Ontario is based on these values, and it is
solved using CPLEX 6.0.
The optimal solution indicates the 45 links that
should be open to the trucks carrying gasoline, fuel
oil, or alcohol. The optimal road network for the
petroleum and coal tar trucks, however, contains only
32 links. The resulting total population exposure in
Western Ontario is 4816 million truck-persons. In
simpler terms, the provincial government can reduce
the average exposure of an individual to 666 trucks
per year by regulating hazmat shipments. This cor-
responds to an average travel distance of 351.5 kilo-
meters and an average exposure of 6053 people per
truck.
For ease of exposition, we present a part of the opti-
mal solution in Figure 3. The decision associated with
Link 30 provides a good example of the complexities
in regulating hazmat shipments. This is the segment
of Ontario Highway 6 between Ontario Highways
401 and 403. Link 30 is on the minimum population
exposure route for the 528 fuel oil trucks travelling
between Halton Hills and Ancaster. When this link
is open to H800 shipments, however, it would also
be used by the 1434 gasoline trucks between Mis-
sissauga and Brant County, since it is on their short-
est route. The net impact of opening Link 30 to H800
shipments is an increase in total population exposure.
Consequently, the fuel oil trucks are forced to follow
a different path than the minimum exposure route
between Halton Hills and Ancaster. It is interesting
that Link 30 remains open to H1600 shipments at the
optimal solution.
In the process of developing the model, we had
a number of meetings with the government agen-
cies responsible for dangerous-goods shipments in
Ontario and Quebec. Given the variety of hazmats
transported, it is quite clear that these agencies do
not have the resources to implement an intricate set
of regulations that vary with each material. Therefore,






























































Kara and Verter: Designing a Road Network











Figure 3 Roads Available for Trucks Carrying Gasoline, Fuel Oils or Alcohol
important in terms of applicability of the proposed
solution. This is the underlying reason for us to cat-
egorize the four materials into two groups. A related
question is “What is the implication of designing a
single network common to all hazmat types?” It is pos-
sible to answer this question by solving a variant of
HND, where Ymij are replaced by Yij . Under this pol-
icy, Link 30 would be closed to H1600 shipments as
well. This implies that 2565 petroleum and coal tar
trucks will have to take routes different than their
minimum exposure path. Taking the argument to the
other extreme, the question would be “What is the
implication of providing the government agency with
the authority and resources to designate shipment-
specific routes?” In answering this question, one needs
to minimize objective function of the outer prob-
lem subject to Constraints (2) and (4). The resulting
model decomposes into a set of shortest path prob-
lems (one for each shipment), where population expo-
sure parameters constitute the arc impedances. The
impact of having no regulation, on the other hand, can
be estimated by minimizing objective function of the
inner problem subject to Constraints (2) and (4). The
task, again, boils down to solving a set of shortest
path problems. Table 2 summarizes the implications
of these alternative regulatory schemes.
The level of government intervention increases
as one gradually moves from “no regulation” to
“shipment-specific” regulations. In Western Ontario,
the implementation of a “single network” policy that
does not differentiate among hazmats would result
in an average truck travel distance of 354.6 kilo-
meters, which exposes each individual to an aver-
age of 68 trucks. If the regulator were to obtain the
legislative power and the resources required for a
“shipment-specific” regulatory scheme, then the indi-
vidual exposure would reduce 2.4%. This regulatory
change would also lead to a 1.4% reduction in the
average travel distance. It is important to note that
regulation of hazmat transportation, in any one of the
three forms presented in Table 2, does make a signif-
icant difference in terms of population exposure.
The extent of government regulation is an issue on
which the stakeholders are likely to disagree. Cur-
rently, many governments have the authority to close
certain road segments to hazmat shipments in their
jurisdiction. It is possible that the trucking indus-
try would object to any extension of government
Table 2 Implications of Alternative Regulatory Schemes
No Single Hazmat- Shipment-
Regulation Network Specific Specific
Population Expo. (106) 65578 4917 4816 4812
Individual Expo. (trucks) 9068 68 666 664
Truck Expo. (people) 82412 6,179 6053 6048
Total Travel (106 km) 127 282 279 278
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authority to further interfere with their operations.
One of the interesting findings of our study is that
both parties are better off when minimum exposure
routes are used for all shipments. It is quite intuitive
that the total population exposure can be reduced by
increasing government intervention. Table 2 shows,
however, that the total travel distance also decreases
as a result of increased level of detail in government
regulation. Although this win-win situation seems
counterintuitive, it can be explained by the coupling
effect of link-based regulation on hazmat shipments.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present an analytical approach for
the problem of designing a road network for hazmat
shipments. Our model represents the distinct deci-
sions made by the regulator and the carriers, as well
as their interaction in determining the total cost of
transportation and the total transport risk. As we
demonstrate in the context of Western Ontario, the
proposed framework can be useful not only for iden-
tifying the road segments that should be closed to
hazmat shipments, but also for evaluating alternative
regulatory schemes. The model can also be used for
identifying the risk and cost impact of adding new
links to an existing road network (e.g., the Quebec
government is considering the completion of High-
way 30, which will allow trucks to avoid passing
through the heavily populated island of Montreal).
We approached the problem from a long-term
perspective in developing the proposed hazardous-
network design model. Note that our problem param-
eters include the annual number of trucks between
each origin-destination pair and the population cen-
sus data. From an operational viewpoint, it is highly
probable that the shipments are not uniformly dis-
tributed throughout the year. Moreover, there can
be significant differences in the population of each
census subdivision between the daytime and the
nighttime. Based on the nature of these variations, a
regulator may find it sufficient to impose time-based
curfews on some road links, rather than completely
banning their use by the hazmat carriers (i.e., a 24-
hour curfew). It is conceivable that a judicious choice
of time-based curfews will lead to significant reduc-
tions in transport risk. There are two major chal-
lenges in implementing this approach. First, there
is a methodological challenge. Cox and Turnquist
(1986) developed a basic model to find the truck
departure time for a given route that minimizes the
delay due to curfews. Nozick et al. (1997) extended
the basic model to also incorporate time-varying arc
impedances. Optimization of time-based curfews in
a regulator’s jurisdiction, however, requires further
extension of these models to a multiple shipment set-
ting, which is nontrivial. Second, and perhaps more
important, the time-based variations in the problem
parameters are not usually included in the readily
available data sets, which would require massive data
collection efforts in a real-life application.
Assessment of the minimum possible transport risk
in a region is traditionally based on the assumption
that the minimum risk route would be used for each
shipment. Carriers, however, would normally use the
shortest paths on the road network available to them.
Thus, our framework also constitutes a means for esti-
mating the margin of error in the traditional risk-
assessment methods. When the minimum exposure
routes are used for all shipments in Western Ontario,
the average travel distance for a hazmat truck is
3496 kilometers (Table 2). On a road network that
is defined as the union of these minimum exposure
routes, however, the carriers would be able to reduce
this average to 348 kilometers by using shorter routes.
As a result, the actual population exposure would be
5% higher than the level of exposure estimated by the
traditional minimum exposure model.
Our results indicate that significant reductions in
exposure risk can be achieved in Western Ontario
through government intervention in the route choices
of carriers. Note that the price tag of these risk reduc-
tion measures would be at least a 100% increase in
the total cost of transportation. Clearly, it is unrealistic
to expect the trucking companies to bear this addi-
tional cost in full. It is equally unacceptable, how-
ever, to have the carriers reflect all of the cost increase
onto their customers, i.e., the shippers of hazmats and
hazardous wastes. Therefore, it is crucial that govern-
ment’s risk reduction efforts include the development
of a mutually acceptable mechanism for allocation of
the associated costs among the trucking companies,
government, and shippers. The structure of such a
cost-sharing framework is out of the scope of this
paper.
One of the challenges in designing a hazardous net-
work is the use of common road links for different
shipments. Clearly, the number of links used for mul-
tiple shipments will have to increase as the number
of shipments increases. However, location of the ori-
gin and destination points and topology of the exist-
ing road network are also key factors that reduce the
possibility of using an exclusive path for each ship-
ment. In this paper, we present a link-based formu-
lation to assist the regulator in identifying the best
way to limit the carriers’ routing choices. That is,
our decision variables represent the status of each
road link (i.e., open/closed and used/unused for each
shipment). An alternative model for the hazardous-
network design problem would be a path-based for-
mulation. In such a model, the decisions would be
the paths that are open to hazmat shipments and
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alternative paths between each origin-destination pair
is, in fact, determined by the regulator’s link-based
decisions. Therefore, the path-based model needs to
include a third set of decision variables that represents
the availability of each link for hazmat shipments.
Naturally, a path would constitute an alternative
route for hazmat carriers only if none of its links
are closed by the regulator. Although the link-based
model proposed in this paper constitutes a more com-
pact formulation, the path-based model would have
the additional capability of characterizing the routing
alternatives offered to the carriers by the regulator. We
believe that such a characterization might prove use-
ful during the negotiations between the two parties.
Thus, our immediate research agenda is to implement
a path-based formulation in tackling the hazardous-
network design problem in Western Ontario.
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